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Abstract. New experimental economic methods are described and used to assess consumers' 
willingness to pay for food products that might be made from new transgenic and intragenic 
genetically modified (GM) traits.  Participants in auctions are randomly chosen adult consumers 
in major US metropolitan areas and not college students. Food labels are kept simple and focus 
on key attributes of experimental goods.  Diverse private information from the agricultural 
biotech industry (largely Monsanto and Syngenta), environmental groups (largely Greenpeace 
and Friends of the Earth) and independent third-party information is used to construct the 
information treatments. Food labels and information treatments are randomized, which is a 
deviation from traditional lab methods. Auctions are best described as sealed bid random n-th 
price and not the standard Vickery 2nd price auctions.  I show that participants in these 
experiments respond to both food labels and information treatments, but no single type of 
information is dominant.
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Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Food Crops:  
Traits, Labels and Diverse Information 
 
The US has more than a decade of experience with commercially marketed, genetically modified 
(GM) horticultural and field crops, and is the dominant player in GM crops.  The first GM 
commercial crops were the Flavr-Savr tomato and the Russet Burbank New Leaf potato, both 
deregulated in 1994 and marketed commercially shortly thereafter.  At about the same time, field 
crop varieties possessing “input traits” were also developed and first marketed commercially.  GM 
papaya was developed by the public sector and successfully marketed a little later. Some of the 
economic issues facing biotech horticultural crops have been summarized by Alston et al. (2006) and 
Bradford and Alston (2004).  
 
In this paper, new experimental economic methods are described and used to assess consumer 
willingness to pay for food products that might be made with new transgenic and intragenic GM 
traits.  Participants in my lab auctions are randomly chosen adult consumers in major US 
metropolitan areas. Food labels are kept simple and focus on key attributes of experimental goods.  
Diverse private information from the agricultural biotech industry (largely Monstanto and Syngenta), 
environmental groups (largely Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) and independent third-party 
information (scientifically objective at the time of the experiments) is used to construct the 
information treatments. Willingness to pay is determined by experimental lab auctions under random 
food label and information treatments. Auctions are best described as sealed bid random n-th price 
and not the standard Vickery 2nd price auctions.  I show that participants in these experiments respond 
both to food labels and information treatments, but no single type of information is dominant. 
The first section of the chapter reviews early development of GM crops that were largely input traits 
of herbicide tolerance and insect resistance that have now spread unevenly across the world, and the 
second section describes some new methods for developing GM vegetable crops with enhanced 
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consumer attributes. The third section summarizes the development of US food-label policy and 
requirements. The fourth section describes new experiments designed to assess consumer willingness 
to pay for GM foods using lab auctions of experimental commodities, and reports results. In the final 
section, some conclusions and predictions about likely future developments in commercial 
horticultural crops are presented.   
 
I.  Early Development of GM Crops 
  
The first commercial GM crops were the Flavr-Savr tomato, developed for sale in the US by Calgene, 
and the Russet Burbank New Leaf potato developed by Monsanto.  These two products were the first 
whole foods produced with biotechnology that were approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration for retail sale.1  The Flavr-Savr tomato, “a delayed-ripening tomato,” was the product 
of more than a decade of research to develop a tomato that could be picked when ripe and transported 
without bruising (Alcamo 1999, pp. 256-257).  The claim was that it would have a longer shelf-life 
than conventional tomatoes and would provide consumers and processors with tastier tomatoes 
because the fruit had been left to mature on the vine.2  This was accomplished by gene-silencing, 
through a antisense RNA that interfered with translation and reduced the production of specific 
proteins that cause ripening (Alcamo 1999, pp. 63-65, 257). 
  
                                                 
1 A potential food safety concern was raised by the fact that in creating the genetically modified tomato, a marker gene for 
the antibiotic kanamycin was inserted. The marker gene is helpful for identifying which plants have been affected by a 
target gene (Alcamo 1999, p. 102-103, 244). When the marker is an antibiotic, technicians test for presence of 
successfully transferred genes of interest by applying the antibiotic. Only those cells that contain the antibiotic resistance 
will survive this treatment, and thereby, indicate that an accompanying target gene is present. The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), however, found no food safety concerns due to insertion of foreign antibiotics into plant cells. 
 
2 Because US winter fresh market tomato production is concentrated in Florida, which means shipping the fruit long 
distances to the US retail markets in the East, Midwest and South, it is important that the fruit does not perish on its 
journey to market because of its soft skin. (Winter tomatoes for the West are generally supplied by Mexico.) The 
conventional solution has been for tomato farmers to pick the fruits while they are green,  i.e., “mature greens,”  transport 
them to the location of the retail market and then spray them with ethylene, a natural ripening agent, to artificially ripen 
and redden the fruit  However, the artificially ripened tomatoes have an inferior flavor relative to vine-ripened tomatoes. 
  
3 
The first Flavr-Savr tomatoes were sold in US grocery stores in the summer of 1994 and were 
marketed as GM.  They sold relatively well at first and were in about 2,500 stores by June 1995, but 
it became apparent that their performance did not match expectations.  First, the genes for delayed 
ripening were inserted into a tomato variety that was best suited for processing, not direct eating, and 
that bruised relatively easily, contrary to its development objective.  Second, contrary to expectations, 
it had a bland taste relative to conventional winter tomatoes.  Third, the new tomato variety was 
suited to California’s dry summer growing conditions, but not to the humid winter tomato growing 
regions of Florida and, as a result, was susceptible to Florida’s tomato fungal diseases.  Fourth, the 
retail price was more than two times higher than conventional fresh market tomatoes.  Hence, a 
number of factors contributed to the failure of the Flavr-Savr tomato in the US market (Alcamo 1999, 
pp. 256-257, Soil Association 2005).  
 
At the same time, Zeneca produced a related high-solids GM tomato for use in purees and soups, 
obtained approval for sale in the UK, and began marketing in 1996 under the brand names Safeway 
Double Concentrated Tomato Puree and Sainsbury’s California Tomato Puree.  These products were 
sold at a lower per unit price than purees from conventional tomatoes and were marketed in larger 
containers to make the product appear to consumers as a “better value.”  By 1999, the GM puree had 
captured up to 60 percent of the processed tomato market share in the UK.  However, when unrelated 
food scares (e.g., BSE in sheep and cattle, dioxin in livestock feed) started to unfold in the UK in the 
late 1990s, Zeneca’s GM high-solid tomato varieties were a casualty, and they were withdrawn from 
the market (Soil Association 2007).  
  
Monsanto engineered the Russet Burbank New Leaf potato to be resistant to the Colorado potato 
beetle, a major potato pest, and this potato was deregulated in 1994.  This new variety offered 
growers the advantage of significantly reducing the need for chemical pesticide applications, and 
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initially gained favor in the fresh potato market.  However, under pressure from consumer groups, 
the fast-food industry (e.g., McDonalds) and grocery store chains would not purchase it or halted 
early purchases, and this prompted Monsanto to withdraw the GM potato variety from the retail 
market in 1999 (Fernandes-Cornejo and Caswell 2006).   
  
To date, the most commercially successful GM crops in the US have been those engineered with so-
called “input traits,” namely insect resistance (Bt) and herbicide tolerance (HT or RR/RoundUp 
Ready®).  These GM traits were obtained by transferring genes largely from soil bacteria into 
selective species of commercial field crops to induce resistance or tolerance to target organisms, 
thereby creating a so-called transgenic crop variety (Alcamo 1999, pp. 250-256).  The target of these 
traits has been canola, soybean, cotton, and corn, with commercial GM varieties of these four crops 
first introduced in the mid-1990s.  As illustrated in Figure 1, these GM field crops, whose products 
are largely destined for oil, feed, and fiber, have had very rapid grower adoption.  For instance, HT 
soybeans were first marketed to farmers in 1996 and now account for more than 90 percent of US 
soybean acreage.  Canola with HT has also been successful, although it is a relatively small acreage 
crop in the US.  Bt and HT cotton also got off to a fast start in 1996.  By 2005, about 60 percent of 
US cotton carried HT or Bt genes, with the most recent varieties carrying both traits as a "stacked 
gene" variety.  GM field corn got off to a slow start, and in 2005 about 30 percent of the corn acreage 
was planted to Bt and 15 percent to HT.3  In corn, recent stacking of multiple Bt genes, imparting 
resistance against European corn borer and rootworm, often together with HT, has pushed GM corn 
acreage up the last two years and is anticipated to become the "gold standard" in the future.4 
  
                                                 
3 Zilberman (2006) has argued that rational regulation of transgenic products should compare their risks and benefits with 
the risks and benefits of alternative technologies. Current regulations ignore the alternatives, and this is costly to society. 
4 Although herbicide tolerant wheat varieties have been developed for the US by Monsanto, they have not been marketed 
widely, nor are they currently available to farmers because of consumer resistance due to the use of wheat largely for food 
such as breads, pastas, etc. 
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Genetic improvement of papaya remains the one bright example of successful public sector 
bioengineering of a horticultural food crop.  Starting in the 1940s, the Hawaiian papaya fruit industry 
was ravaged by a ringspot virus and, by the 1980s, Hawaii’s papaya production had fallen 
significantly and was concentrated in the Puna district of the Big Island.  However, by the early 90s, 
ringspot virus was invading that area, too.  The University of Hawaii-Manoa, Cornell University and 
the USDA-ARS then initiated new research and developed a transgenic papaya variety that was 
resistant to ringspot, labeled Rainbow, and it was released freely to farmers in 1998 (Gonsalves and 
Ferreira 2003, Gonsalves 2004).  Since its introduction, the Rainbow variety of papaya has been used 
strategically to create a virus-free ring as a buffer to slow the spread of papaya ringspot virus in the 
Puna area and to slow the development of resistance to the new technology (Gonsalves and Ferreira 
2003, Zilberman 2004). Papaya is the only US crop in which public sector scientists have pioneered 
the development of a commercially successful GM crop variety.  
 Overall, the early commercial successes with GM crops were not with horticultural crops, but 
rather with a small set of field crops.  The most likely reason is that consumers failed to personally 
see enhanced value from many of the new GM traits that were scientifically possible.  In fiber crops 
and crops that are used heavily, but not exclusively, for livestock feed, consumer acceptance was less 
important.  However, the image of GM crops with consumers has been damaged by the fact that new 
GM products with unique enhanced consumer attributes have been slow to develop.  
 
II.  New Development of GM Vegetable Crops 
 
As transgenic GM technology has been developed and marketed for a small set of field crops, a new 
line of research has recently emerged around intragenic GM horticultural crops (Rommens et al. 
2004, 2005).  Prompted by continued consumer resistant to transgenic food crops, these new methods 
introduce new traits into a crop variety by using only DNA from the same species, thereby yielding 
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an "intragenic" genetic modification. This research was made possible by a small set of scientists 
recognizing that a huge range of genetic diversity exists within horticultural crops that have been 
grown for a long period of time under diverse environments and human needs, perhaps in relative 
isolation. For examples, major genetic diversity exists in potato and tomato, stretching from very old 
primitive or landrace varieties to the modern commercial varieties of today.  However, in the case of 
the potato, in-breeding depression, tetraploid genetics and clonal propagation conspire to make 
traditional breeding difficult and slow.  By taking a new intragenic bioengineering approach, genomic 
and metabolic pathway discoveries can be quickly introduced into established commercial varieties to 
fast-track the breeding process without introducing foreign DNA or antibiotic markers  
  
Economists have shown recently that consumer acceptance of GM food crops is intimately linked to 
the type of traits engineered into the crops, the types of food labels on retail food products, and the 
information environment.  For example, the GM food market has been subjected to diverse and 
conflicting information, and this makes informed decision-making by consumers and producers 
difficult (Rousu et al. 2007).  Although the first commercial GM crop was a horticultural crop (the 
Flavr-Savr tomato) with “enhanced consumer attributes,” all of the other commercially successful 
GM crops in the US have possessed input traits—traits that reduce either the cost of production or the 
variance in the cost of production to farmers and, hence, have only benefited consumers to the extent 
that they have lowered food prices or increased food availability.  Although Falck-Zepeda et al. 
(2000) and Moschini et al. (2000) show that consumer surplus benefits from these technologies have 
been sizeable, these benefits have not registered effectively with consumers.  With new intragenic 
potatoes and tomatoes that are engineered for dramatically enhanced antioxidants and vitamins (e.g., 
vitamin C, A, or E), improved starch content, and/or reduced bruising becoming scientifically 
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possible, US consumers may, for the first time, see GM crops as having direct positive value to 
them over conventionally bred crops.5   
 
III.  Food Labels and Information 
 
Economists have shown that food labels and information are important factors conditioning   
consumer response to GM foods (for example, see Huffman and Rousu 2006, Rousu et al. 2007, and 
Moschini and Lapan 2006.)  Food products in the US can be labeled for nutritional claims and for 
safety. The 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act dramatically changed nutrition labels on 
packaged foods sold in US supermarkets (Balasubramanian and Cole 2002).6  This law requires 
packaged foods to display nutrition information prominently in a new label format, namely the 
Nutrition Facts panel.  It also regulates serving size, health claims (that link a nutrient to a specific 
disease), and descriptor terms, e.g., “low fat”, on food packages.  The goal of this legislation was to 
improve consumer welfare by providing nutrition information that would assist consumers in making 
healthy food choices.  
  
As an indication of the costliness of effective food nutrient labeling, it is estimated that the US food 
industry spent $2 billion to comply with the 1990 Nutrient Labeling Act (Silverglade 1996).  
However, some attributes, such as enhanced calcium and vitamins A and C, are viewed positively by 
consumers, i.e., more is better in the case of positive consumer attributes. But other food attributes, 
such as salt, fat and pesticide residue, are negative, and then the consumer views less to be better.  
Food labels before the Nutriention Labeling Act had a seeming emphasis on negative labeling.  
                                                 
5 Antioxidants are substances that may protect human cells from the damage otherwise caused by unstable molecules 
known as free radicals.  Free radical damage over time is believed to cause some types of cancer.  Antioxidants interact 
with and stabilize free radicals and may prevent some of the damage free radicals otherwise might cause.  Antioxidants 
include beta-carotene, lycopene, vitamins C, E, and A, and other substances.  These compounds are sometimes called 
phytonutrients and are naturally occurring in at least low levels in most fruits and vegetables. 
6 Unpackaged foods, for example fresh fruits and vegetables, are not affected. 
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Balasubramanian and Cole (2002) suggest that this tendency can be explained by consumers having 
an asymmetric value function, weighing a dollar of loss more heavily than a dollar of gain, which is 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) prospect theory.  
 
The policies under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act also tend to emphasize negative rather 
than positive labeling.  First, permissible health claims are ones that associate specific nutrients with 
reduced risk of specific diseases.  Of the seven health claims approved by the FDA at the onset of the 
new nutrient labeling act, three linked negative attributes exclusively with deadly diseases, i.e., 
dietary fat with cancer, sodium with hypertension, and dietary saturated fat with high cholesterol and 
heart disease, and only one claim featured a positive attribute, i.e., calcium and osteoporosis.  Later 
claims have, however, been more balanced.  Second, regulations on nutrient-content claims tend to 
focus more heavily on negative attributes (calories, sugar, sodium, fat, fatty acids and cholesterol) 
than on positive attributes such as fiber and vitamins.  
  
Clearly, with foods made currently from crop varieties that contain GM input traits, adding a label for 
GM content would be an example of labeling a negative food attribute.  However, GM content has 
not been proven scientifically to have human health consequences, except for the transport of some 
known allergens to new locations.  Hence, GM food labels today would not meet the nutrition 
labeling law requirement of a proven nutrient intake leading to a better health outcome. 
  
Genetically engineered products used for food, however, do have to pass a food safety test. In 1992, 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced its landmark decision that food and food 
products will be regulated the same as those created by conventional means.  This policy allows new 
GM foods to be treated as conventional foods as long as they meet three conditions: their nutritional 
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value has not been lowered; they incorporate new substances that are already a part of the human 
diet; and they contain no new allergenic substances.  In January 2001, the FDA issued a “Guidance 
for Industry” statement reaffirming this policy.  In this statement, the FDA stated to the biotech 
industry that the only GM foods that need to be labeled are foods that have different characteristics 
from the non-GM version, e.g., elevated vitamin A levels.  In the US, labeling food for GM content is 
not otherwise required.  Firms, however, are to notify the FDA at least four months before putting a 
new GM food product on the market, and the scientific description of the product is posted on the 
Internet for review during this time (Just et al. 2006).  Only minor changes have been made in these 
guidelines since 2001.  
 
Hence, the GM-labeling policy in the US can be classified as being voluntary.  If a voluntary label is 
affixed, the FDA has mandated that it cannot use the phrase “genetically modified.”  The FDA 
prefers the phrase “genetically engineered” or “made through biotechnology.”7  Effective GM-
labeling, however, involves real costs, especially the costs of testing for the presence of GM content, 
segregating GM and non-GM products, variable costs of monitoring for truthfulness of labeling and 
enforcement of the regulations that exist, and risk premiums for being out of contract (Wilson and 
Dahl 2005, Roe and Sheldon 2007). 
  
An effective GM-labeling policy includes effective segregation of GM from non-GM commodities.  
If one or the other of these products could be inexpensively color coded, segregation might not be 
very expensive.  If, however, identity preservation through the production, marketing and processing 
chain was required, this system would be substantially more costly (Wilson and Dahl 2005). To the 
                                                 
7 In contrast, the European Commission adopted GM food labels in 1997.  The Commission requires each member 
country to enact a law requiring labeling of all new products containing substances derived from GM organisms.  Japan, 
Australia and many other countries have also passed laws requiring GM labels for major foods.  The international 
environmental lobby has frequently argued that “consumers have the right to know whether their food is GM or not” 
(Greenpeace 2001). 
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extent that there is a market for non-GM products, buyers would be expected to specify in their 
purchase contracts some limit on GM content and/or precise prescriptions regarding 
production/marketing/handling processes.  One can envision a marketplace of buyers with 
differentiated demand according to their aversion to GM content.  To make this differentiation 
effective, new costs and risks are incurred.  Additional testing involves costs of conducting the tests, 
for which there are several technologies of varying accuracy.  The risk is that GM products will be 
commingled with non-GM-products, so the detection system must test to see that customers’ 
shipments are within contract limits for GM content.  This is a serious economic problem, as agents 
seek to determine the optimal strategy for testing and other risk mitigation strategies.8 
  
While private sector handlers routinely segregate and blend grains and beans as a primary function of 
their business, new risks arise when handling GM and non-GM-products, due to the added risk of 
adventitious commingling.  When GM is the inferior product, growers and handlers of GM products 
have an incentive to mix GM with non-GM products.  For US grains, Wilson and Dahl (2005) 
suggest that this risk may be about 4 percent at the grain elevator level.  Farmer-processor contracting 
in horticultural or specialty crops, however, could reduce this margin by specializing in the product 
being delivered, such as non-GM or a positive GM trait.  Another source of risk is testing, because no 
test is 100 percent accurate.  Testing risk, however, varies with the technology, tolerance and variety 
of products handled, and seems likely to fall over time, as the technology of testing advances.  
 
                                                 
8 “Tolerances” are an important issue in segregation and identity preservation.  GM tolerance refers to the maximum 
impurity level for GM content that is tolerated in a product that still carries the non-GM label.  There are two levels where 
tolerances apply: one is defined by regulatory agencies such as the FDA, and the other is commercial tolerance.  
Individual firms can and seem likely to adopt different tolerance levels, subject to any regulation.  Moreover, different 
countries are likely to have different tolerance levels, and this increases the risks and costs of segregation or identity 
preservation. 
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In markets where there is imperfect information due to one or more parties having private 
information, private parties have an incentive to use their information to enhance their private goals 
(Akerlof 1970, Molho 1997).  Highly conflicting information has been injected into the GM food 
market by interested parties.  These vested parties are the agricultural biotech industry (see Huffman 
and Evenson 2006, pp. 153-183), including Monsanto, DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred, Dow, Syngenta and 
BASF that have disseminated information that is very favorable to GM technologies, crops and food 
products, and environmental groups, including Greenepeace, Friends of the Earth, Action Aid and 
Earth Watch, that have disseminated information that is very negative about GM crops, such as 
calling it "Frankenfood" (Rousu et al. 2004b).  This diverse information has undoubtedly contributed 
to the GM food controversy and may be one factor explaining differences across Western countries in 
their acceptance of GM crops.  Also, consistent with consumer education, independent third-party or 
verifiable information about agricultural biotechnology may have considerable value if available and 
disseminated to consumers (Huffman and Tegene 2002, Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Rousu et al. 
2007).  Verifiable information provides an objective assessment of the benefits and costs, including 
environmental risks, of GM crop varieties and the foods made from these raw materials.  Hence, 
society can avoid losses due to strategic behavior of interested parties toward new technologies and 
products if decision makers have access to and use independent third-party or verifiable information.  
 
IV.  Experiments Designed to Assess Consumer Willingness to Pay for GM Foods 
 
Because GM foods are relatively new, my research team has chosen to use an auction market setting 
(Smith 1976) to collect information about consumer willingness to pay for (or demand) GM foods 
(Huffman et al. 2003, Rousu et al. 2007).  This reflects the reality that GM food products are not 
generally labeled in the US, so grocery store purchases are not informative on this issue.  Some 
scientists have used contingent value or stated preference surveys of consumer willingness to pay for 
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new products.  These surveys are known to contain hypothetical bias; participants in these surveys 
are not required to execute their stated preferences, i.e., “Participants don’t have to pay what they 
say.”  For example, see Haneman 1984, Mendenhall and Evenson 2002, and Chern and Rickertsen 
2004.  
   
In contrast, in our auction market settings, consumers were expected to execute their winning bids by 
purchasing one unit of the auctioned commodity.  Also, in contrast to most economics experiments 
that use university undergraduate students from the investigator’s class as auction participants, we 
used randomly chosen adult consumers in major metropolitan areas that were identified by an 
independent survey agency. Individuals were told that an Iowa State University (or Iowa State 
University and University of Minnesota, or Iowa State University and Pennsylvania State University) 
project was being undertaken to obtain consumers’ assessments of food and new household products. 
In particular, screened individuals were not told that they would be assessing GMOs or even would 
be participating in an experimental auction.  
  
Economists frequently choose a Vickery 2nd price auction for valuing goods. However, it is well 
known that individuals who anticipate that they are far from placing the margin bid will bid randomly 
and insincerely. These participants have a real sense that their bid is not pivotal in determining the 
market price. We chose the random n-th price auction (Shogren et al. 2001). In this auction, the 
winning bidders are chosen from a uniform distribution over 1 to n, the total number of bidders in a 
session. For example, if there are 15 participants in a session, the bids are first ranked from 1 to 15, 
and the randomly drawn n is 5; then the four highest bidders pay the 5th highest price. With this type 
of auction mechanism all bidders are engaged because they sense that their bid will help determine 
the market price, or bidding their true willingness to pay is a weakly dominate strategy (McFadden 
2007). Moreover, our auction is best described as being a sealed-bid random nth price auction, 
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because no information about willingness to pay for experimental products is released before all 
bids are placed. 
    
Individuals who agreed to participate came to a central location, signed a personal consent form, were 
paid $40 for their participation, and completed a short questionnaire on their social-demographic-
economic characteristics and beliefs about a few technologies, including GMOs. Next they received 
instruction in the mechanics of a random n-th price auction. First, a candy bar was auctioned. Second, 
a candy bar, deck of playing cards, and box of ball point pins were auctioned to help participants 
become comfortable placing a bid on each of three unrelated commodities in a single round of 
bidding. Next, they took a short test on their understanding of the auction mechanism and any 
questions were answered. The auctioning of experimental commodities followed. After winning bids 
were determined, the participants completed another short survey, and then were told to execute 
winning binds by completing purchases of auctioned commodities in an adjacent stock room. 
Otherwise, they were told that they were free to leave. 
  
In the first (2001) set of experiments, we chose participants who resided in the Des Moines, IA and 
St. Paul, MN areas, and they bid on a 32 oz bottle of vegetable oil (made from soybeans), a one 
pound bag of tortilla chips (made from yellow corn), and five pounds of fresh russet potatoes.  In the 
second (2007) set of experiments, we chose participants who resided in the Des Moines and 
Harrisburg, PA areas, and they bid on one pound of fresh broccoli, one pound of tomatoes and five 
pounds of russet potatoes. 
 
Simple food labels were constructed and placed on packages of all experimental foods (see 
Appendices A and C for the exact layout).  These labels were designed by the researchers and contain 
only key facts.  
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In all of our experiments, we used three sets of diverse information about genetic modification and 
GM foods to construct information treatments:  (1) the industry (pro-biotech) perspective—a 
collection of statements and information on genetic modification provided by a group of leading 
biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta; (2) the environmental group (anti-
biotech) perspective—a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from 
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group; and (3) the independent, third-party (verifiable 
information)  perspective—a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group, 
consisting of a variety of people knowledgeable about GM goods, including scientists, professionals, 
religious leaders, and academics, who do not have a financial stake in GM foods.  We limited the 
information statements about a particular party’s perspective to one 8 1/2”x11” sheet of paper and 
organized the information under five different headings:  General Information, Scientific Impact, 
Human Impact, Financial Impact and Environmental Impact, to reduce the information load on 
participants (See Appendices B and D, Figures 1, 2 and 3).  Information treatments, consisting of 
one-to-three of the above information types, were injected into each of the sessions or experimental 
trials. For example, in the first set of experiments, the information treatments were: (1) only the 
industry perspective, (2) only the environmental group perspective, (3) industry and environmental 
perspectives, (4) environmental and third-party perspectives, (5) industry, environmental and third 
party perspectives. Information treatments were randomly assigned sessions without replacement. 
When a session received industry and environmental perspectives, the order was randomized. When a 
session received the third-party perspective it was always displayed last. 
  
In the Des Moines and St. Paul experiments, each experimental unit (or session) of 13-16 
individuals/consumers participated in only two rounds of bidding on experimental food items.  The 
rounds were differentiated by the food label.  In one round, which could be round 1 or 2 depending 
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on the experimental unit, participants/consumers bid on three food products, each with a 
conventional food label that was made as plain as possible to avoid any influence on bids due to the 
label design.  It stated only the type of food and weight.  In the other round, participants bid on the 
same three food products with a GM label, which differed from the conventional food label by the 
inclusion of only one extra sentence:  “This product is made using genetic modification (GM).”  Each 
session or experimental unit received an information treatment chosen randomly from the six 
available treatments.  Once the appropriate information treatment was distributed to participants in a 
given unit (session), two auction rounds were then conducted.  A total of 172 individuals participated 
in this set of experiments.  
 
In the Des Moines and Harrisburg experiments, each experimental unit (or session) of 13-16 
individuals/consumers participated in four rounds of bidding on experimental food items.  The rounds 
were differentiated by the composition of the food label, which had seven variants (with a maximum 
of four used in any session):  
 Plain or conventional,  
 Plain plus the statement Intragenic GM Product,  
 Transgenic GM Product, 
 Enhanced Levels of Antioxidants and Vitamin C - Intragenic GM Product,  
Enhanced Levels of Antioxidants and Vitamin C – Transgenic GM Product,   
Enhanced Levels of Antioxidants and Vitamin C - GM Product,  
GM Free Product, or 
No Information.  
 
Although all bidders in a session or round of bidding saw the same food labels, they received 
different information treatments in the Des Moines and Harrisburg experiments.  The Des Moines 
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and Harrisburg experiments were unique in not only distinguishing the type of GMO, but also for 
injecting a treatment with “No Information.”  Also, the exact wording of the three types of 
information was modified to be appropriate to the emphasis of these experiments; for example, the 
industry perspective and third-party perspective described the key differences between “Transgenic” 
and “Intragenic GM Products" (Appendix D, Figures 2 and 3).   
 
V.  Experimental Evidence on Key Bid-Price Differences  
  
We first consider simple mean differences between genetically modified and conventional foods and 
then turn to a regression analysis of individual bidder price differences.  In the latter analysis, the 
emphasis is on information treatments effects.  
 
A.  Simple Differences in Mean Bid Prices.  
We first examine simple bid-price differences for consumer willingness to pay for food items labeled 
as being genetically modified versus having a plain/conventional food label, specifying only the type 
and weight of the food (plus packaging date for tortilla chips).  Using the 2001 Des Moines and St. 
Paul data, we examine overall bids for GM—vs. plain/conventionally-labeled food products.  As 
shown in table 1 panel A, on average, bidders discounted the GM-labeled product by about 15% 
relative to its plain-labeled counterpart.  The discount that bidders placed on the GM-labeled products 
did not vary significantly across the three products examined (also see Huffman et al. 2003b), but for 
tortilla chips the difference was different from zero at the 10% significance level.9   
  
Turning to the 2007 Des Moines and Harrisburg samples, bidders were, on average, willing to pay a 
sizeable premium for food products containing the label “Enhanced Levels of Antioxidants and 
                                                 
9 All three differences are significantly negative at better than the .07 significance level. 
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Vitamin C – Intragenic GM Product” relative to a plain/conventionally-labeled food product.  The 
premium ranged from 39 cents to 45 cents per unit on the three food products, or 19% to 26% higher.  
The mean price for each of the three commodities—broccoli, tomatoes and potatoes—with enhanced 
attributes relative to products with a plain/conventional label, was different from zero at the 5% 
significance level.10  Hence, when consumers bid on GM products containing input traits, the GM 
product was weakly inferior to the plain/conventionally labeled product.  However, when consumers 
bid on fresh intragenic GM horticultural products containing enhanced levels of antioxidants and 
vitamin C, they were willing to pay a premium and, hence, the intragenic products were economically 
and statistically superior to a plain/conventionally-labeled product.11  These results imply a dramatic 
difference in the incentives for private industry to label new genetically modified products with 
enhanced consumer attributes relative to those derived from raw materials that contain input traits 
(also see Roe and Sheldon 2007).  
 
B.  Individual Bid-Price Differences and Diverse Information.   
We now provide econometric evidence relating individuals’ bid-price differences to information 
treatments and food labels.  In table 2, the results from fitting a model explaining the difference 
between a participant’s bid on a product with a GM label and a plain/conventional label under one of 
six information treatments, are presented.  The model of bid price differences is fitted with 
commodity fixed effects (but no intercept) to observations from the 2001 Des Moines-St. Paul 
sample.  Recall that the mean bid-price difference is negative for this sample of bidders.  The 
estimated coefficients for information treatment effects show that in auction sessions where bidders 
received only anti-biotech information the bid price differences were larger and negative (between 
                                                 
10 The mean bid prices where the biotech method was switched from intragenic to transgenic, but otherwise containing 
enhanced consumer attributes, were larger than for the plain label but 14-22% lower than for the intragenic label. 
11 We have not undertaken sensory tests to determine whether consumers can perceive any differences in the conventional 
product relative to one with intragenic enhanced consumer attributes.  Given that no “foreign” DNA nor antibiotic marker 
in present in the intragenic product, my hypothesis is that no perceived sensory differences exists.  Moreover, Zhao et al. 
(2007) found no difference in a sensory analysis of conventional and organically grown fruits and vegetables, except that 
conventionally grown tomatoes scored slightly higher for ripeness, which is positively correlated with flavor intensity.  
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GM and plain-labeled, or the GM-labeled food was more heavily discounted) and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.  When bidders received only pro-biotech information, bid price 
differences were reduced, but the difference was not significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
(or 10 percent) level.  When bidders received both pro-biotech and anti-biotech information, the bid 
price difference was reduced, reflecting the opposing forces of the two types of information in this 
information treatment.  Moreover, this information treatment did not have a statistically significant 
affect on bid price differences.  From these results, we conclude that in those sessions where bidders 
received only anti-biotech or both pro-biotech and anti-biotech information, they bid differently than 
when they received only pro-biotech information. 
 
When bidders were in sessions that received the pro-biotech and verifiable information treatment, the 
impact of this combination was not statistically significant.  When bidders were in sessions that 
received anti-biotech and verifiable information, bid price differences are reduced (less negative) and 
the difference is significantly different from zero.  Hence, those who received a treatment of anti-
biotech information and verifiable information discounted GM foods less than those who received 
only a treatment of anti-biotech information.  When bidders were in sessions that received a treatment 
that contained all three types of information (pro-biotech, anti-biotech, and verifiable), the impact of 
this treatment on bid price differences was small and not statistically significant.  Hence, in this 
complex setting, verifiable information did not have a distinguishable effect.   
 
To focus more specifically on the potential significance of verifiable information types on bidders’ 
behavior, we performed a joint test that verifiable information had no effect on bidder behavior (see 
table 2).  We did this by deleting the three information treatments that included verifiable information 
as a component of a treatment.  The sample value of the chi-squared statistic for this test is 7.17 with 
3 degrees of freedom and, at a 10 percent significance level; the tabled chi-squared is 6.97.  Hence, 
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verifiable information had a statistically significant effect on bidders’ willingness to pay for 
commodities that might be genetically modified.  
 
Other results in table 2 include the following.  Bidders who had larger household incomes discounted 
GM by a larger amount that those with less household income.  This result is statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level and is consistent with non-GM products being viewed, on average, by bidders 
as a superior product.  Participants coming into our experiments were asked about how well-informed 
they were about genetic modification.  This subjective information was then coded into a 
dichotomous variable.  Those bidders who considered themselves to be at least “somewhat informed 
about GM foods” discounted GM-labeled foods more than did other bidders.  This effect is 
statistically significant (at the 10 percent level).  Moreover, this result suggests that bidders in our 
experiments who were “GM-informed” had, on average, acquired/received negative information 
about GM foods prior to the experiment.12  Bids also were affected by the labeling sequence.  Bidders 
in sessions that bid on the GM-labeled food products in round one (and the plain-labeled food 
products in round two) discounted GM-labeled foods by less than those who were in sessions that bid 
on the products in the opposite order.  The regression coefficient for this regressor is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, and the result reinforces the importance of randomized assignments 
of treatments to sessions in experimental auctions, which is an innovation in our methodology.  
Finally, we performed a joint test of no explanatory power for the regression model reported in table 
2, conditional on pooled data with commodity fixed effects and censoring.  The sample value of the 
chi-squared statistic is 18.6 with 10 degrees of freedom.  The tabled value of the chi-squared statistic 
at the 5 percent significance level is 18.3.  Hence, this null hypothesis of no explanatory power of the 
regression model fit to the 2001 samples is rejected.   
                                                 
12 See Huffman et al. (2006) for an analysis of the impact of bidders’ prior beliefs about GM technology and food 
products on their willingness to pay for food items that are potentially GM.  
 
  
20 
  
Next, we turn to the 2007 sample of individuals from Des Moines and Harrisburg. Table 3 reports on 
a regression model explaining an individual’s bid price difference between intragenic-labeled foods 
and plain/conventionally labeled foods, excluding bids for products that were labeled as having 
enhanced consumer attributes.  In these results, the base case with no-information treatment gives a 
bid-price difference of intragenic GM- over plain-labeled food products by a statistically significant 
52 cents per unit of product. When pro-biotech information treatment was injected into the 
experiments, the bid price difference is a statistically significant 73 cents per unit or 21 cents more 
than for the no-information treatment, suggesting a net positive influence of industry-provided 
biotech information on willingness to pay for intragenic GM products.  The injection of the anti-
biotech information treatment gives a bid price difference of only 25 cents per unit, which is 27 cents 
per unit lower than for the no-information treatment.  However, this coefficient is not different from 
zero at the 5 or 10 percent significance levels, suggesting that environmental groups do not 
distinguish between intragenic and transgenic biotech methods for engineering new crops.  The 
injection of a pro-biotech and anti-biotech treatment (where the order is random across participants in 
a session) increases the bid price difference by a statistically significant 56 cents per unit.  The impact 
of this information treatment on bid price differences is slightly higher (4 cents per unit) than for the 
no-information treatment, which is a reflection of the opposing forces of pro-biotech and anti-biotech 
information, but with the edge going to the pro-biotech information.  When the injected information 
treatment includes all three types of information (with verifiable information always last), the bid 
price difference is larger by a statistically significant 44 cents per unit, which is 8 cents less than for 
the no-information treatment.  Comparing this result to the previous one, verifiable information 
seems to be a moderating force relative to the pro-biotech industry perspective.  Finally, in a test that 
all of the regression coefficients in table 3 are jointly equal to zero, the null hypothesis is rejected at 
the 5 percent significance level.  Hence, this econometric model has significant explanatory power of 
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bid price differences. 
  
Consumers have expressed some skepticism of transgenic GM food products, and our 2007 Des 
Moines and Harrisburg data set shows that consumers bid significantly higher prices for intragenic 
than transgenic food products that contain enhanced levels of antioxidants and vitamin C.  However, 
the differences in these bid prices may be affected by the information environment in which 
consumers are bidding.  To test this hypothesis, we examine the differences in bid prices for products 
with an intragenic GM label versus one with a transgenic GM label.  Observations are pooled across 
all three commodity types and the estimation takes account of censoring of differences due to a single 
zero bid price in one of the two bid prices used to construct this difference.  Observations with double 
zero bids are excluded because they were judged to contain no useful information relative to our 
hypothesis.   
 
These new results are reported in table 4.  Bid price differences for the base case of the no-
information treatment is 18 cents per unit higher for intragenic than transgenic, but this number is not 
significantly different from zero at the 10 or 5 percent levels, suggesting that this information is truly 
uninformative about these biotech methods.  In contrast, an injection of the pro-biotech information 
treatment gives a bid price difference by a statistically significant 67 cents per unit, suggesting that, 
on net, the industry perspective favors intragenic over transgenic.  In contrast, an injection of anti-
biotech information treatment gives a bid price difference of only 17 cents per unit, which is slightly 
lower than the point estimate for the no-information treatment and 50 cents per unit lower than for the 
pro-biotech information treatment.  Injection of the pro-biotech and anti-biotech information 
treatment gives a bid price difference of a statistically significant 42 cents per unit, which is in the 
middle of the estimates for the pro-biotech and anti-biotech treatment estimates.  The injection of the 
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information treatment containing all three information types gives a bid price difference of 38 
cents, which suggests that objective information moderates the positive impact of the pro-biotech 
information on bid-price differences. 
  
In table 4, the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable denoting that the food product has 
enhanced antioxidants and vitamin C is a positive 12 cents per unit, and significant at the 10 percent 
level.  This result suggests that the presence of enhanced consumer attributes increases the value to 
bidders of the intragenic over transgenic methods.  The results in the table also show that significant 
“bidding round or order effects” exist in the data, which supports methodological advances using 
randomization.  Household income has no impact on bid-price differences in these results.  In 
conclusion, I can say that the information setting affects consumer discounting of transgenic relative 
to intragenic horticultural products. 
 
C.  Individual Differences in Bid Prices and Prior Information   
New food products using genetically modified crops appeared in US supermarkets starting in 1996, 
and consumers perceived some risks. Because consumers are exposed to diverse and sometimes 
conflicting perspectives about GM technologies and foods, they form subjective beliefs.  Huffman et 
al. (2007) examined the role of these prior beliefs on consumer willingness to pay for foods that 
might be genetically modified.  The data are from the 2001 Des Moines and St. Paul experiments, 
where participants were asked before the experimental auction how well-informed they were about 
genetic modification—extremely, well, somewhat, not very well or not informed at all.  Huffman et 
al. show that participants who had informed prior beliefs about genetic modification discounted GM-
labeled food products by a larger amount than those who had uninformed prior beliefs.  Also, 
uninformed participants were especially susceptible to information from interested and third parties.  
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In contrast, informed participants were generally not affected significantly by new information.  
These results contradict some earlier psychological studies that claimed that individuals tend to base 
rates (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). The results show how both skeptics and proponents of new 
technologies might try to manage information to achieve private or group-wide, but not social, 
objectives. 
 
D.  Other Related Results 
1.  Rousu et al. (2004a) examine the impact of tolerance levels, or the impact of the minimum level of 
GM contamination that will pass as GM-free.  Using the 2001 Des Moines and St. Paul data, they 
examine bids on three food products that have different tolerance labels.  In one trial, all consumers 
bid on foods with a non-GM label, certified to be completely free of genetically engineered material, 
and in the other trial, consumers bid on foods with a non-GM label indicating that a certain 
percentage of genetically modified material, either one or five percent, was tolerated.  Consumers in 
these treatments did not receive any information on GM food products.  This experiment contained 
three experimental units/sessions with a total of 44 participants. 
  
Rousu et al. found evidence that consumers preferred foods that were 100% non-GM, relative to food 
products with small amounts of GM material (one or five percent).  Consumers bid approximately 10 
percent less for the GM-tolerant food products than they did for the certified GM-free products.  
However, they found that once GM content was present, no difference existed in bids between foods 
that contained 1 percent vs. 5 percent GM content (Rousu et al. 2004a).  Thus, while these findings 
indicate that a significant percentage of consumers will pay more for GM-free labeled food products 
relative to conventionally labeled food products, it does not appear that one percent or higher 
tolerance levels for GM material matters.    
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V.  Discussion of GM Technology and Mixed Messages 
 
Although consumers in the US are relatively tolerant of alternative production methods for their food, 
they do respond adversely to some risks.  For example, when genetic modification refers to input 
traits, consumers in our experiments discounted GM food products by 15 percent, relative to a plain- 
or conventionally-labeled alternative.  This seems to arise from environmental, biodiversity or health 
concerns from introducing foreign DNA into food crops.  To circumvent these concerns, new 
methods have been developed for intragenic genetic modification, where no foreign DNA is 
introduced in the GM varietal development process.  Our results from the 2007 data support the 
hypothesis that consumers have a more favorable perspective about these genetic modifications, and 
that they are, in fact, willing to pay a premium for enhanced levels of antioxidants and vitamin C by 
intragenic GM methods.  However, when we were experimenting with food traits to consider 
including as enhanced food products, we experimented with “low pesticide residual” as a food quality 
attribute.  Consumer reaction to this trait was complex, because the label raised a dormant issue that, 
yes, there is pesticide residue in our food.  Mentioning that insect resistant (Bt) traits could be 
introduced so as to reduce the need for farmers to apply commercial pesticides, and thereby reduce 
chemical pesticide residual, was a hard sell.   
  
Along a similar line of mixed messages, Markosyan et al. (2007) conducted surveys of consumers in 
grocery stores in October 2006 in the Pacific Northwest to test their willingness to pay for “naturally 
enriched antioxidant coatings” embedded in the wax on retail fresh apples.  In general, consumers 
were willing to pay a little, four to eight percent more, for the antioxidant enhanced apples, but a 
number of consumers were quite negative about the technology, e.g., “I don’t want to eat wax,” “it is 
unnatural,” “additives to fruit are not necessary,” “washing apples removes the wax,” “prefer foods 
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without additives,” and “it is better to get nutrients naturally.”  Hence, adding antioxidants to the 
wax of apples also raised the dormant issue that fresh commercial applies are waxed.   
 
VII.  Conclusions and Predictions for the Future 
 
More than a decade has passed since the first genetically modified foods appeared in US grocery 
stores.  Early attempts to market fresh horticultural products, in particular, the Flavr-Savr tomato and 
the Russet Burbank Newleaf potato failed after very brief appearances in the market.  Input traits 
developed by transgenetic methods applied to field crops have been much more successful, but 
consumers continue to express some resistance to them because of environmental, biodiversity or 
human health concerns.  Recent developments of new intragenic GM methods are exciting because 
they permit scientists to use diverse genes and attributes identified in the genomes of particular 
horticultural plants to quickly enhance quality attributes of commercial varieties of crops like potato 
and tomato.  This is very important in potato breeding, where it is impossible for scientists to 
dramatically enhance conventional levels of vitamin C and antioxidants using a range of conventional 
non-GM breeding methods.  The new intragenic GM potato varieties enhanced with antioxidants and 
vitamin C promise to be the first successful commercial GM product with consumer traits on the 
market. 
  
Economists’ research has shown that US consumer acceptance and willingness to pay for GM food 
crops is not only conditioned by the nature of the new trait and the method of DNA transfer, but also 
by the content of food labels, prior beliefs of consumers, and content of diverse information injected 
into the food market about GM technologies and food products.  During the era of input-trait 
dominated GM foods, consumers have revealed that GM food products are weakly inferior to 
conventional products, which means that marketers of GM food products will not label voluntarily.  
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With the commercialization of new intragenic GM products with enhanced consumer attributes, 
these new GM food products promise to command a premium relative to conventional food products.  
Hence, the private sector's incentive to voluntarily label GM products will change dramatically.  This 
promises to be a positive development in the commercialization of GM food products.   
  
During the era of input traits, consumers’ informed prior beliefs were somewhat negative about 
agricultural biotechnology and GM foods.  These prior beliefs, however, have the potential to become 
more favorable toward GM horticultural crops as new products with intragenic GM-enhanced 
consumer attributes become generally available in the food market.  Also, strong evidence exists that 
consumers are positively influenced by biotech industry or pro-biotech information, and negatively 
affected by environmental group or anti-biotech information.  Moreover, third-party verifiable 
information has been shown to be a moderating influence on consumer interpretation of anti-biotech 
and pro-biotech information and on willingness to pay for GM foods.  Hence, a future role exists for 
public sector provision of third-party verifiable information about GM technologies and GM food 
products.  This new information will affect prior beliefs of consumers about GM food products and 
be a useful input to objective assessments of new GM food products that enter the market, which 
could be important to the commercial successes of new GM horticultural crops.  
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Figure 1 
Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops: U.S., 1996-2007 
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Table 1.  Mean Bids Reflecting Consumer Willingness to Pay for Specially Labeled 
Commodities Across All Information Treatments: Evidence from Two Sample Groups 
(standard deviation or error of the mean in parentheses) 
 
Label Commodities 
Panel A:  Des Moines and St. Paul samples (n = 172)a/ 
 Vegetable Oil Tortilla Chips Potatoes 
GM-input traits $0.91 $0.93 $0.78 
 (0.0618) (0.0651) (0.0651) 
Plain 1.05 1.08 0.91 
 (0.0648) (0.0648) (0.0694) 
 
Difference 
 
$-0.14             
 
$-0.15* 
 
$-0.13 
 
 
(0.896) 
           
(0.0919) 
 
(0.0914) 
Panel B:  Des Moines and Harrisburg samplesb/ 
 Broccoli Tomatoes Potatoes 
Intragenic GM with enhanced 
vitamin C and antioxidants (n = 
98)c/ 
 
$1.675 
 
$1.764 
 
$2.610 
 ( 0.1146) (0.1275 ) (0.1861) 
Plain (n = 92) 1.284 1.376 2.157 
 ( 0.0791) (0.1024 ) (0.1205) 
 
Difference 
 
$0.391** 
 
$0.388** 
 
$0.454** 
 (0.1410) (0.1648) (0.2248) 
a/ One unit of each commodity equals a 32-oz. bottle of vegetable oil, a 1-pound bag of tortilla 
chips, and a 5-pound bag of russet potatoes. 
b/ One unit of each commodity equals 1-pound of loose broccoli, 1-pound of Beefeater tomatoes, 
and a 5-pound bag of russet potatoes. 
c/  Mean bid prices for transgenic GM commodities with enhanced attributes are: $1.448, $1.408 
and $2.269, which are significantly less than the means for intragenic GM but more than the 
means for plain-labeled products. 
* Denotes a difference that is different from zero at the 10% significance level. 
* Denotes a difference that is different from zero at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 2.  Explaining Bid Price Differences Between GM- and Plain-Labeled Foods:  Estimate 
of Censored Regression with Observations Pooled Across Commodities and Commodity Fixed 
Effects – Des Moines and St. Paul Samples (n=516, standard errors are in parentheses)a 
 
 Dependent variable:  Bid price GM-labeled food less bid price plain-labeled food  
Regressors Coefficients 
Information Treatments:  
   Pro-biotech       0.073       (0.097) 
   Anti-biotech      -0.432**   (0.093) 
   Pro-biotech x anti-biotech       0.199       (0.131) 
   Pro-biotech x verifiable      -0.007       (0.088) 
   Anti-biotech x verifiable       0.205**   (0.090) 
   Pro-biotech x anti-biotech x verifiable      -0.065       (0.157) 
Other variables: 
   Labels-Round 1 dummy 
       
- 0.115**   (0.053) 
   Gender dummy        0.045       (0.054) 
   Income of household     -0.00001**(0.00) 
   Informed about GM per-experiment       -0.093*     (0.054) 
Chi-squared for excluding 3 regressors 
 containing verifiable information 
 7.177* 
Chi-squared for no explanatory power of 
 all above regressors jointly 
76.44** 
 
a  The estimated coefficients for the commodity fixed effects are not reported. Observations with 
double zeros were excluded.                               
*  Denotes a coefficient or effect that is different from zero at the at the10% significance level.                              
** Denotes a coefficient or effect that is different from zero at the at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 3.  Explaining Bid Price Differences Between Intragenic GM-Labeled Foods and Plain-
Labeled Foods (no enhanced consumer attributes):  Estimate of Regression with Observations 
Pooled Across Commodities and Commodity Fixed Effects – Des Moines and Harrisburg 
Samples (n = 276, standard errors are in parentheses)a 
 
 Dependent variable:  Bid Intragenic GM-labeled less plain-labeled food  
Regressors Coefficients. 
Information Treatments:  
    No Information  0.52**   (0.21) 
    Pro-biotech  0.73**   (0.21) 
    Anti-biotech   0.25       (0.20) 
    Pro-biotech x anti-biotech   0.56**   (0.19) 
    Pro-biotech x anti-biotech x verifiable    0.44**   (0.19) 
Other Variables:  
    Round 2 dummy -0.29**  (0.15) 
    Round 3 dummy -0.37**  (0.15) 
    Round 4 dummy -0.47**  (0.16) 
    Income of household ($K) -0.01      (0.01) 
F value for no explanatory power of 
     all above regressors jointly 
27.5** 
 
a  Sample considers all observation except for the commodities labels with enhanced vitamin C and 
antioxidants. Note: The estimated coefficients for the commodity fixed effects are not reported.                               
*  Denotes a coefficient or effect that is different from zero at the at the10% significance level.                             
** Denotes a coefficient or effect that is different from zero at the at the 5% significance level.. 
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Table 4.  Explaining Bid Price Differences Between Intragenic GM-Labeled and Transgenic 
GM-Labeled Food (over all labels):  Estimate of Censored Regression with Pooling of 
Observations Across Commodities and Commodity Fixed Effects – Des Moines and Harrisburg 
Sample (n = 521 , standard errors are in parentheses)a 
 
 Dependent variable:  Bid price Intragenic GM label less bid price Transgenic GM-label  
Regressors Coefficients. 
Information Treatments:  
    No Information   0.180       (0.13) 
    Pro-biotech   0.667**   (0.14) 
    Anti-biotech    0.168 **  (0.13) 
    Pro-biotech x anti-biotech   0.422**   (0.14) 
    Pro-biotech x anti-biotech x verifiable    0.377**   (0.14) 
Other Variables:  
    Dummy for enhanced antioxidants and vit C  0.116*   (0.07) 
    Round 2 dummy -0.407**  (0.09) 
    Round 3 dummy -0.130**  (0.05) 
    Round 4 dummy -0.218*    (0.05) 
    Income of household ($K) -0.004    (0.01) 
 
a The estimated coefficients for the commodity fixed effects are not reported. Observations with 
double zero excluded.                              
* Denotes coefficient or effect that is statistical significance at the10 percent level.                             
** Denotes coefficient or effect that is statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Appendix A.  GM- and Plain Food Labels for 2001 Des Moines and St.  Paul Experiments 
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Appendix B:  Information Injected into the 2001 Des Moines and St. Paul Experiments 
 
Figure 1.  The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from 
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group. 
 
General Information 
Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your food sources today.  
There are many reasons that genetically modified foods should be banned, mainly because unknown 
adverse effects could be catastrophic!  Inadequate safety testing of GM plants, animals, and food 
products has occurred, so humans are the ones testing whether or not GM foods are safe.  Consumers 
should not have to test new food products to ensure that they are safe. 
 
Scientific Impact 
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts them into another.  This 
process is very risky.  The biggest potential hazard of genetically modified (GM) foods is the 
unknown.  This is a relatively new technique, and no one can guarantee that consumers will not be 
harmed.  Recently, many governments in Europe assured consumers that there would be no harm to 
consumers over mad-cow disease, but unfortunately, their claims were wrong.  We do not want 
consumers to be harmed by GM food. 
 
Human Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose major health problems.  The potential exists for allergens to 
be transferred to a GM food product that no one would suspect.  For example, if genes from a peanut 
were transferred into a tomato, and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats this new tomato, they 
could display a peanut allergy. 
 
Another problem with genetically modified foods is a moral issue.  These foods are taking genes 
from one living organism and transplanting them into another.  Many people think it is morally 
wrong to mess around with life forms on such a fundamental level. 
 
Financial Impact 
GM foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only about their own 
profits and ignore possible negative side effects.  These groups are actually patenting different life 
forms that they genetically modify, with plans to sell them in the future.  Studies have also shown 
that GM crops may get lower yields than conventional crops. 
 
Environmental Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards.  Sparse testing of GM plants for 
environmental impacts has occurred.  One potential hazard could be the impact of GM crops on 
wildlife.  One study showed that one type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies. 
 
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that begin to resist GM plants that 
were engineered to reduce chemical pesticide application.  The harmful insects and other pests that 
get exposed to these crops could quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of the potential 
advantages of GM pest resistance. 
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Figure 2.  The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification 
provided by a group of leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta.   
 
General Information 
Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the greatest discoveries in the 
history of farming.  Improvements in crops so far relate to improved insect and disease resistance and 
weed control.  These improvements using bioengineering/GM technology lead to reduced cost of 
food production.  Future GM food products may have health benefits.  
 
Scientific Impact 
Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food products that are approved by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Genetic engineering has brought new opportunities to 
farmers for pest control and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient enhanced foods.  GM 
plants and animals have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in the history of agriculture.  
We have just seen the tip of the iceberg of future potential.  
 
Human Impact 
The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous.  A special type of rice called   
“golden rice” has already been created which has higher levels of vitamin A.  This could be very 
helpful because the disease Vitamin A Deficiency (VAD) is devastating in third-world countries.  
VAD causes irreversible blindness in over 500,000 children, and is also responsible for over one 
million deaths annually.  Since rice is the staple food in the diets of millions of people in the third 
world, Golden Rice has the potential of improving millions of lives a year by reducing the cases of 
VAD. 
 
The FDA has approved GM food for human consumption, and Americans have been consuming GM 
foods for years.  While every food product may pose risks, there has never been a documented case 
of a person getting sick from GM food. 
 
Financial Impact 
Genetically modified plants have reduced the cost of food production, which means lower food 
prices, and that can help feed the world.  In America, lower food prices help decrease the number of 
hungry people and also let consumers save a little more money on food.  Worldwide the number of 
hungry people has been declining, but increased crop production using GM technology can also help 
further reduce world hunger.  
 
Environmental Impact 
GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical insecticide 
application by 50 percent or more.  This means less environmental damage.  GM weed control is 
providing new methods to control weeds, which are a special problem in no-till farming.  Genetic 
modification of plants has the potential to be one of the most environmentally helpful discoveries 
ever. 
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Figure 3.  The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group, 
consisting of a variety of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods, including 
scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics.  These parties have no financial stake in 
genetically modified foods. 
 
General Information 
Bioengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred across plants or animals, 
a process that would not otherwise occur (in common usage, genetic modification means 
bioengineering).  With bioengineered pest resistance in plants, the process is somewhat similar to the 
process of how a flu shot works in the human body.  Flu shots work by injecting a virus into the body 
to help make a human body more resistant to the flu.  Bioengineered plant-pest resistance causes a 
plant to enhance its own pest resistance. 
 
Scientific Impact 
The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM food products (chips, cereals, potatoes, etc.) are 
based on the principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although they have been 
modified slightly from the original plant materials.   
 
Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been refined, and this process removes essentially all 
the GM proteins, making them like non-GM oils.  So even if GM crops were deemed to be harmful 
for human consumption, it is doubtful that vegetable oils would cause harm. 
 
Human Impact 
While many genetically modified foods are in the process of being put on your grocers’ shelves, there 
are currently no foods available in the US where genetic modification has increased nutrient content. 
 
All foods present a small risk of an allergic reaction to some people.  No FDA approved GM food 
poses any known unique human health risks. 
 
Financial Impact 
Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek profits.  For 
farmers to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from the switch.  However, genetic 
modification technology may lead to changes in the organization of the agri-business industry and 
farming.  The introduction of GM foods has the potential to decrease the prices to consumers for 
groceries. 
 
Environmental Impact 
The effects of genetic modification on the environment are largely unknown.  Bioengineered insect 
resistance has reduced farmers’ applications of environmentally hazardous insecticides.  More studies 
are occurring to help assess the impact of bioengineered plants and organisms on the environment.  A 
couple of studies reported harm to Monarch butterflies from GM crops, but other scientists were not 
able to recreate the results.  The possibility of insects growing resistant to GM crops is a legitimate 
concern.   
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Appendix C.  Examples of the Five Different Food Labels-Products in the 2007 Des Moines 
and Harrisburg Experiments  (Note that these labels are smaller than the true label size) 
 
 
Potato (5 lbs.)  
Potato (5 lbs.) 
 
GM Free Product 
   
Potato (5 lbs.) 
 
Intragenic GM Product 
 
Potato (5 lbs.) 
 
Transgenic GM Product 
 
 
Potato (5 lbs.) 
 
Enhanced levels of 
Antioxidants and Vitamin C 
 
GM Product 
 
Potato (5 lbs.) 
 
Enhanced levels of 
Antioxidants and Vitamin C 
 
Intragenic GM Product 
 
Potato (5 lbs.) 
 
Enhanced levels of 
Antioxidants and Vitamin C 
 
Transgenic GM Product 
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Appendix D.  Information Injected into the 2007 Des Moines and Harrisburg Experiments 
 
Figure 1. The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from 
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group. 
 
General Information 
Genetic modification (GM) takes genes from one organism and places then into another.  The process 
lets scientists manipulate genes in an unnatural way.  Inadequate safety testing of GM plants and food 
products has occurred.  Humans and the Earth are being used as guinea pigs for testing whether 
“Frankenfoods” are safe.  GM foods should be banned because their effect on consumers and the 
environment is unknown and potentially catastrophic!  Genetic modification is one of the most risky 
things being done to your food sources today and should be stopped before more damage is done.   
 
Scientific Impact 
All genetic modifications of plants are risky.  All GM techniques are relatively new and no one can 
guarantee that consumers or the environment will not be harmed.  The biggest potential hazard of 
GM foods is the unknown.   
 
Human Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose serious risks to human health.  Some foods contain allergens, 
and the potential exists for allergens to be transferred into a GM food product that no one would 
suspect.  For example, if the genes from a peanut were transferred into a tomato, and someone who is 
allergic to peanuts eats this GM tomato, he could display a peanut allergy.  
 
Another problem with transgenic foods is a moral issue.  Many GM techniques transfer genes across 
species.  We believe it is morally wrong to alter life forms on such a fundamental level. 
  
Financial Impact 
GM foods are being pushed onto consumer by big businesses which only care about their own profits 
and ignore possible negative side effects.  These groups are actually patenting new life forms they 
create with plans to sell for profits.  Studies have shown that GM crops may even get lower yields 
than conventional crops. 
 
Environmental Impact 
GM foods could pose major environmental hazards.  Little testing of GM plants for environmental 
impacts has occurred.  One potential risk of GM crops is their impact on wildlife, including wild 
species of plants and insects.  A study showed that one type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies.  
 
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that become resistant to new naturally 
occurring toxic substances engineered into plants to kill pests—insects and worms—or to make a 
plant resistant to a particular herbicide application.  The target pests that get exposed to these new 
GM crops could quickly develop tolerances and wipe out many of the potential advantages of GM 
pest resistance.   
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Figure 2.  The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification 
provided by a group of leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto, Pioneer and 
Syngenta. 
 
General Information 
Genetically modified (GM) plants have the potential to be one of the greatest discoveries in the 
history of farming.  GM crops have lowered food production costs by improving insect and disease 
resistance and weed control in plants.  New genetic engineering techniques could dramatically 
enhance consumer benefiting attributes of food such as vitamins, antioxidants, flavor, and shelf life.  
These improvements to plant quality can only be attained through GM, not conventional breeding. 
 
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and places them into another.  
There are two distinct types of GM used by biotechnology companies.  Transgenic GM transfers 
genes between two unrelated organisms, for example from soil bacteria to corn.  Intragenic GM 
involves transferring genes between two breeds of the same organism, for example, from wild species 
of corn to a commercial variety of corn. 
  
Scientific Impact 
Both transgenic and intragenic techniques are used to produce food products that are approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Intragenic modification is a genetic technique for 
significantly speeding up the conventional process of plant cross-breeding, which has been 
undertaken by farmers and plant breeders for thousands of years.  Many industry groups believe 
intragenics should require minimal FDA testing because no foreign genes or proteins are added to the 
GM plant.  We have only seen the tip of the iceberg of the future potential of GM for improving 
worldwide health and nutrition through enhanced plants. 
 
Human Impact 
The potential exists for GM to dramatically enhance traits that have direct value to consumers, such 
as increased vitamins and antioxidants, more flavor, longer shelf life, lower pesticide use, and 
reduced cost of production.  Superior GM plants will help reduce worldwide malnutrition and 
improve the healthiness of foods.  The FDA has approved GM food for human consumption, and 
Americans have been consuming GM foods for a decade.  While every food (modified or not) poses 
some risks, there has never been a documented case of a person getting sick from GM food. 
 
Financial Impact 
With the introduction of enhanced nutrition, antioxidants, shelf life, flavors and other consumer-
desired attributes using GM technology, consumers will for the first time enjoy the direct benefits of 
genetic engineering.  GM plants have reduced farmers’ costs, which mean lower food prices.  
Worldwide the number of hungry people is declining.  GM technology is helping to feed the world 
and improve worldwide nutrition. 
 
Environmental Impact 
Genetic modification of plants has the potential to be one of the most environmentally helpful 
discoveries ever.  GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical 
insecticide application by 50% or more.  GM weed control is providing new methods to control 
weeds, which are a problem in no-till farming. This means greater crop yields and less environmental 
damage. 
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Figure 3.  The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group 
consisting of a variety of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods including: 
scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics.  These parties have no financial stake in 
GM foods.   
 
General Information 
The process of genetic modification (GM) takes genes from one organism and places them into 
another.  There are two distinct types of GM used by biotechnology companies.  Transgenic GM 
transfers genes between two unrelated organisms, for example from soil bacteria to corn.  Intragenic 
GM involves transferring genes between two breeds of the same organism, for example from wild 
species of corn to a commercial variety of the crop.  Hence, intragenic modification has much in 
common with conventional plant breeding.   
 
Scientific Impact 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standard for GM food products is based on the principle 
that they have essentially the same ingredients, although modified from the original plant.  Almost all 
GM crops meet the FDA’s substantive equivalent requirement.  Hence, they do not require special 
testing before commercial marketing can occur.   
  
Human Impact 
Many scientists see intragenics as having real potential for enhancing consumer attributes of plants 
such as dramatically increasing vitamin and antioxidant levels, extending shelf life, and reduced 
chemical pesticide application without concerns about gene transfer across species.  These 
improvements to plants are only possible using genetic modification and not conventional breeding. 
 
All foods present a risk of an allergic reaction to a small fraction of the population.  No FDA 
approved GM food poses any known unique human health risks, but when genes are transferred 
across species, a new allergen is possible.  This is more likely with transgenics than intragenics.  
While GM crops can result in higher yields and enhanced nutrition, there is no consensus whether 
GM foods have or will reduce worldwide hunger.  
 
Many people have moral or religious objections to GM.  Some groups see intragenics as being more 
acceptable because genes are transferred between two breeds of the same species.   
 
Financial Impact 
GM seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek profits.  For farmers to switch to 
GM crops, they must see benefits from making a change.  Consumers must also see benefits from 
consuming GM foods—lower price or enhanced consumer attributes.  However GM technology may 
lead to changes in the organization of the agri-business industry and farming.   
 
Environmental Impact 
The long-term effects of GM on the environment are largely unknown.  Bioengineered insect 
resistance has reduced farmers’ applications of environmentally hazardous insecticides, but resistance 
to this bio-control system will increase over time.  More studies are occurring to help assess the 
impact of bioengineered plants on the environment.  Some studies reported harm to Monarch 
butterflies from GM crops, but other scientists were not able to recreate the results.  
 
Enhanced consumer attributes, such as vitamins, antioxidants, and longer shelf life due to intragenics 
pose no known environmental hazards. 
 
